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Abstract 
In many contemporary societies, multiple functions are connected to hunting. Here, we use 
the concept of multifunctionality to investigate the role of hunting beyond its traditional 
function of supplying meat. Hunting may contribute, for example, to biodiversity 
conservation, recreation and the preservation of economies and cultures of rural areas. Our 
comparative analysis of hunting in eight study sites in Europe and Africa examines the 
tensions and trade-offs between these ecological, economic and social functions of hunting, 
and investigates the interplay between the institutions regulating these functions to better 
understand conflicts over hunting. Based on this analysis, we present institutional 
arrangements that have developed to address these challenges of multifunctionality, and 
explore the institutional change brought about by such arrangements. Finally, we discuss 
implications of this study for policy and institutional design.  
 
Key words: conservation, culture, governance, hunting, institutions, institutional interplay, 
multifunctionality.  
 
1 Introduction 
In many societies, multiple functions are linked to hunting. ‘Hunting’ does not only denote 
the act of pursuing and taking wild animals for meat, trophy or fur, but can, for example, also 
be understood as an important part of wildlife management that may contribute to 
biodiversity conservation or to the success of activities such as farming and forestry, as it 
keeps grazers, crop pests or predators under control. In many rural regions, hunting 
fundamentally shapes both the natural environment and people’s ways of life (Adams et al. 
2009). We thus refer to hunting here as the totality of activities concerned with the 
management and the pursuit of game. The “multifunctionality of hunting”, then, denotes the 
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multiple benefits that hunting and related land management practices may provide for society 
such as food, recreation, employment in the tourism industry, cultural identity and desired 
ecological outputs. However, hunting is not only associated with benefits. Hunting and 
related management practices may also have undesired effects, for example, where species 
seen as valuable by some are persecuted by others as ‘vermin’ that threaten game 
populations.  Hunting can thus contribute to several objectives at once (Abler 2004) but can 
equally create costs. The concept of multifunctionality has primarily been developed in 
relation to the multiple roles of agriculture (OECD 2001, Wiggering et al. 2003). As in 
agriculture, the various functions of hunting can be complementary, synergistic or in 
competition with each other (Rossing et al. 2007), and they can affect public as well as 
private goods. However, in contrast to the multifunctionality of agriculture which focuses on 
the joint provision of market- and non-market goods and services (Vandermeulen et al. 
2006), classification of the functions of hunting into commodities (i.e. market goods) and 
non-commodities is far less clear-cut.  
The present study addresses the interplay of the multiple functions of hunting in eight study 
sites in Europe and Africa. To understand the tensions that arise from this interplay, we 
analyse the multifunctionality of hunting from an institutional perspective, as many of the 
functions of hunting are enshrined in formal and/or informal institutions. Insight into the 
ways in which these different institutions interact with each other is crucial to understand the 
governance of multifunctionality, and thus ultimately the potential of institutional 
arrangements to enhance or ameliorate conflicts over wildlife management (Woodroffe et al. 
2005). Rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of a specific institutional arrangement in 
relative isolation, we thus aim to provide an overview of the multifunctionality of hunting 
and related institutional issues across a range of different ecological, social and political 
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contexts, in order to identify and conceptualise the resulting challenges for the governance of 
hunting on a more general level than a single case study could.  
To do so, we develop a conceptual framework to explore the multiple functions of hunting 
and the effects of related institutions, and their interplay, on the sustainability of hunting in 
our study cases. We then examine emerging institutional arrangements aimed at reconciling 
clashes between functions. Finally, we discuss implications of this study for policy and 
institutional design.  
 
2 Conceptual framework 
2.1 Multiple functions 
Based on ideas on the multifunctionality of agriculture (Pretty et al. 2001, Hagedorn 2008), 
forestry (Slee 2007), and landscape planning (Selman 2009), in the first step of our analysis 
we describe functions of hunting in relation to three categories, namely the (a) ecological , (b) 
economic and (c) socio-cultural functions of hunting (Fig. 1). We define functions here as the 
provision of goods and services, regardless of whether these are commodities or non-
commodities. Economic functions of hunting include, for example, both hunting for 
subsistence and hunting to obtain income from selling game and trophies, but also the sale of 
the hunting opportunity, i.e., hunting tourism (Bennett and Robinson 2000). The term ‘socio-
cultural’ is here used in a broad sense including non-market values, social capital, social 
status and impacts on quality of life (Slee 2007), whereas ‘ecological’ refers to functions of 
hunting in relation to the ecology of a system, for example, population management. The 
importance of such ecological functions is, for example, stated in the European Charter of 
Hunting and Biodiversity which considers hunting as a legitimate and important tool in the 
management of biological diversity (Council of Europe 2007).  
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This three-dimensional structure, differentiating between social, economic and ecological 
aspects, is well-established in the sustainability discourse (Costanza 1999; Baker 2006), and 
frequently also used in relation to multifunctionality (Van Huylenbroeck et al. 2007; Van 
Cauwenbergh et al. 2007), occasionally even in relation to functions of hunting (Cahoone 
2009). It has been used both in a normative function (e.g., Baker 2006) and as a structure for 
scientific inquiry and analysis (e.g., Costanza 1999; Glaser and Diele 2004; White et al. 
2009). Whilst we employ this categorisation of three different function types here in an 
analytical (i.e., non-normative) manner to explore the emerging tensions, we do not imply 
any judgements on the effects and legitimacy of these functions and the assumed causalities, 
such as the impact of herbivores on ecosystems, or the impact of hunting activities on the 
well-being of the hunter.  
 
2.2 Multiple institutions and their interplay 
In a second step, we analyse the institutional arrangements related to each of these functions. 
We understand institutions here as rules (North 1990) that guide human behaviour. Formal 
institutions are usually written and codified sets of regulations and contracts (e.g., 
legislation), while informal institutions are typically unwritten and include, for example, 
implicit codes of conduct, taboos and other social norms (North 1990; Young 2002). 
Boundaries between formal and informal institutions can be blurred; for example, previously 
formal institutions can become informal due to regime changes.  
Institutions regulate social life. They reflect values and interests, and thus help to reproduce 
and maintain them in society (Vatn 2005). Institutions as crystallised values are thus a crucial 
element of social life at all levels, from local customs to international conventions; and 
institutional analysis aims to reveal such societal mechanisms. We use the term ‘governance’ 
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here to refer to the entire body of societal mechanisms that steer people’s behaviour. 
Governance is thus to a large degree constituted by institutions (Paavola and Adger 2005).  
Functions of hunting are usually enacted through a multitude of formal and informal 
institutions. Their interplay (Young 2002, Gehring and Oberthür 2007) may create tensions, 
but may also, when coordinated, lead to synergies (Hagedorn 2008). Institutional interplay 
may not only arise between the three different categories of functions and their associated 
institutions, but also within each one of these due to competing values or ideas about hunting 
and wildlife management (Loewen 2006). 
Although institutional interplay has been recognised as a real life problem (Folke et al. 2007) 
that can severely hamper the success of institutional reform (Young et al. 2008), relatively 
little research has been conducted on actual cases (e.g., Moss 2004), particularly at the local 
level. In this study, we focus on functional interplay, i.e., situations where two or more 
institutions address the same issue (Young 2002, Loewen 2006).   
 
2.3 Institutions for multifunctionality 
In the third step of our analysis (Fig. 1), we will look at the ways in which conflicts and 
tensions between institutions have been addressed by the creation or emergence of 
institutional arrangements that reconcile or mediate between conflicting institutions and 
interests. Among the many possible ways of classifying institutional arrangements, or policy 
instruments more generally (for an overview see e.g., Vedung 2003; Jordan et al. 2003), we 
draw here on four categories to explore the governance approaches underpinning these newly 
emerging arrangements, namely (i) market-based governance mechanisms, (ii) hierarchical 
mechanisms, i.e., regulations or ‘command-and-control’ mechanisms, (iii) cooperation, i.e., 
collaborative arrangements, and (iv) information, such as certification that enables the 
consumer to make informed choices, widely used in forest and fishery management. These 
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categories thus include not only the three types of policy instruments first described by 
Etzioni (1975), and established by Bemelmans-Videc et al. (2003) as “carrots, sticks and 
sermons”, but also cooperation, often conceptualised as self-governance (e.g., Dietz et al. 
2003). Although complex institutional arrangements often come about through institutional 
‘bricolage’ (Cleaver 2002), i.e., an undirected rather than a targeted process, our analysis 
might contribute to an improved design of such arrangements in the future.  
 
3 Methods and case studies 
We conducted a comparative case analysis based on systematic collection of qualitative 
standard information across selected units (Table 1). Using structured focused comparison the 
investigator “defines and standardizes the data requirements of the case studies [...] by 
formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case” 
(George and McKeown 1985). We draw here on eight cases to capture a rich picture of the 
social, cultural, economic and ecological variation within which hunting is conducted. These 
included three cases in northern Europe (Norway, Sweden and Scotland), one in southern 
Europe (Spain), two in eastern Europe (Croatia and Slovenia) and two in Africa (Ethiopia and 
Tanzania). The cases selected neither claim to be representative for their respective countries 
nor do they aim to present a complete assessment of all hunting types in a given place; rather, 
they were chosen for their diversity of cultural, ecological and economic aspects and the 
availability of data (such as access to policy documents, ecological and social scientific 
studies). While some cases include an entire country (e.g., moose hunting in Sweden), others, 
where there was a large degree of diversity within country, refer to a specific area (e.g., 
bushmeat hunting in Western Serengeti, Tanzania; see Table 1). 
Our analysis was based on an iterative process (Fig. 2), starting with a scoping phase, where 
issues such as hunting rights, land use rights, hunting styles, game species, responsible 
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authorities, relevant stakeholders and main controversies were identified. This provided the 
foundations for developing our ideas about the multifunctionality of hunting, and a 
framework for analysis was set up to allow a comparative approach (Fig. 1). We then 
examined policies and documents, including bills and management plans to assess formal 
institutional arrangements, and supplemented the analysis by data from semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions with both hunters and non-hunters, including 
governmental and non-governmental actors, to obtain information about informal institutions 
as well as evaluations of the existing arrangements
1
 (Fig. 2). Our conceptual framework thus 
emerged from the data (against the backdrop of theoretical considerations) rather than being a 
priori imposed on the data, was developed and refined throughout the entire process and used 
to investigate differences and similarities between study cases to assess the complex patterns 
of institutional interplay. We thus employed an inductive approach, starting from a 
description of the hunting system, identifying commonalities, differences and patterns in the 
functions and institutional arrangements, and drawing in concepts from the literature to 
capture these patterns as and when we considered these appropriate and helpful.  
Regardless of differences in hunted species, similar functions seemed to be linked to hunting 
in all sites that varied merely in their intensity and relative importance. Classification into the 
three categories (i.e., ecological, economic and social) was not meant as an absolute 
categorisation since most functions could be seen from more than one perspective. Instead, it 
was intended to provide structure to the analysis. 
 
                                                          
1
 Large parts of the data collected in these focus group discussions and interviews concerned the cultural 
meanings of hunting in the respective study site and are thus in detail analysed elsewhere (e.g., Lowassa et al. 
forth., Tadie and Fischer forth.). Site-specific sample sizes: Croatia n=29, Ethiopia n=144, Scotland n=37, 
Slovenia n=38, Spain n=40, Sweden n=41, Tanzania n=79. In Norway, no new data was collected; instead, we 
drew on existing information from previous studies (see e.g., Andersen et al. 2009; Sandström et al. 2009).  
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4 Multifunctionality of hunting (Step 1) 
4.1 Ecological functions of hunting  
In all our European study sites, hunting is regarded as an integral part of biodiversity 
management. For example, in Scotland and Sweden, red deer and moose management aims to 
maintain populations to enhance conditions for recreational and trophy hunting, while at the 
same time regulating populations in relation to other land use objectives, for example, the 
regeneration of forests for conservation purposes and commercial forestry. However, 
population levels optimal for trophy hunting are usually seen as detrimental for land uses that 
centre on woodlands, and conflicts between these two different management goals occur 
regularly (Wennberg DiGasper 2008).  
The red-legged partridge is a small farmland bird widely hunted in Spain. High densities of 
partridge are associated with areas of non-intensive agriculture, which are also good for 
farmland biodiversity in general (García et al. 2008). However, commercial forms of 
partridge hunting are often based on intensive management which includes rearing and 
releasing of large numbers of bird as well as predator control (both legally and illegally). This 
causes tensions between game management and predator conservation (Villafuerte et al. 
1998, Virgós and Travaini 2005). Similar to the Swedish and Scottish cases, land 
management for hunting (and not the hunting itself) leads here to an increase in the 
abundance of the game and some associated species, resulting at the same time in a decrease 
in abundance and diversity of non-game species such as predators (Blanco-Aguiar et al. 
2008, Casas and Viñuela 2010). 
In Croatia and Slovenia, hunting serves as the main tool to control the numbers of brown 
bears. However, although both countries share the same mobile population, bear hunting in 
Croatia is regulated for commercial (trophy) hunting, while in Slovenia, since the country’s 
accession to the EU, hunting is only allowed under derogation from the Habitats Directive. In 
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both countries, the bear population seems to have reached the socially acceptable maximum 
(Huber et al. 2008a). The overall goal is now to maintain bear numbers (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2002, Dečak et al. 2005).  A similar situation occurs in Norway where lynx are 
associated with a range of conflicts, in particular with sheep and reindeer husbandry. In 
addition, the presence of lynx is regarded as in conflict with roe deer hunting. Government 
policy is to keep the lynx population at a level at which these conflicts are acceptable to 
society as a whole (Linnell et al. 2010).  In all these sites, hunting thus has a clear function of 
population control, but at the same time, game management for (trophy) hunting often leads 
to a disproportionate increase in the game species population and other effects considered 
negative from an ecological perspective.  
In Ethiopia and Tanzania, hunting is at present – except where wildlife such as elephants or 
carnivores are seen to infringe on human livelihoods – not specifically aimed at population 
control. However, trophy hunting can have indirect ecological effects through its economic 
function where income from hunting tourism is shared with protected areas and adjacent 
communities and incentivises wildlife conservation (Nelson 2007). Overall, aside from (not 
necessarily intended) ecological impacts more generally, hunting and associated land 
management practices thus have, at least in the European cases investigated, functions for 
population management of game and associated species. The actual implementation of these 
functions is often the subject of disputes between different groups of actors.  
 
4.2 Economic functions of hunting  
In several of our study cases, the main economic function of hunting is the provision of meat. 
In the southwest of Ethiopia, opportunistically hunted bushmeat (e.g., gazelles and other 
small game) is often consumed by the hunters themselves, for example, while herding 
livestock, whereas parts of big game, such as giraffe tails, can generate significant revenue. In 
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western Serengeti (Tanzania), many households consume bushmeat themselves and/or sell it 
on to obtain cash for other needs, such as clothes or school fees (Loibooki et al. 2002). In 
northern Sweden, moose meat is often consumed by the hunters or sold, with an estimated 
third of the total monetary value of moose hunting being meat value, while two thirds are 
related to recreation, for example, travel costs (Mattsson et al. 2008). In contrast, in Croatia 
and Slovenia, bear meat constitutes less than 10% of the monetary value of bear hunting. Due 
to underdeveloped markets, red deer venison in Scotland is also of limited financial value 
(MacMillan and Leitch 2008).  
In addition to the provision of meat, hunting also has other economic functions. Recreational 
hunting and, in particular, trophy hunting, are very profitable forms of wildlife use in many of 
our study sites. In the African sites, especially in Tanzania, trophy hunting (as well as non-
consumptive wildlife tourism) provides a substantial net contribution to the national economy 
(Thirgood et al. 2008). In Scotland, red deer hunting is run commercially, and provides rural 
employment for gamekeepers and stalkers and the hospitality sector, and a similar picture is 
found in Croatia and Slovenia. Also in Spain, partridge hunting, which was once a traditional 
practice, has over recent decades become an activity of increasing economic relevance that 
attracts non-local hunters, and now constitutes an important part of rural economies (Caro et 
al. 2009). In contrast, hunting in Sweden and Norway is primarily seen as a leisure activity 
rather than as a tourism-related business opportunity. Hunting tourism is thus currently a very 
small, although growing, sector of nature tourism (Willebrand 2009).  
Overall, we thus found two types of economic functions of hunting in our case study areas: 
First, a contribution to local livelihoods directly through the consumption or sale of meat and 
other animal products, and second, the economic impacts of a commercialised recreational 
hunting industry. In some sites, such as Scotland, economic benefits from recreational 
hunting accrue to the landowners and their staff, e.g., professional stalkers, and thus allow 
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employment in remote rural areas, even though stalking as such might not always be an 
economically viable business (MacMillan and Leitch 2008).  In other areas, benefits of the 
recreational hunting industry for local communities might be less visible, as license fees are 
collected by national-level authorities. 
 
4.3 Social functions of hunting  
In our study cases, we found the social functions of hunting to relate predominantly to the 
development and maintenance of social capital (Putnam 2000) and respect, prestige and 
status, i.e., symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1977). In the south of Ethiopia, big game hunting is an 
indication of manly bravery and maturity, especially among the Hamar people, and helps to 
create non-kin relationships that can be drawn on in times of hardship (for more detail see 
Tadie and Fischer, forth.). In Tanzania, bushmeat hunting is not generally seen as a high 
status activity – on the contrary, villagers in our focus group discussions referred to hunting 
as a poor man’s activity. However, the meat and cash income that bushmeat hunting provides 
can be very attractive to women, as several of our informants suggested (for more detail see 
Lowassa et al., forth.).  
In Scotland, deer stalking is part of a 150 year old hunting culture, and continues to be one of 
the main activities of upland estates. Even where stalking is not commercially viable, it is a 
culturally important activity and has important bonding functions that help develop and 
reassure one’s social status (MacMillan and Leitch 2008). Similar functions can also be 
observed in Sweden where moose hunting teams are organised on a voluntary basis by local 
hunters’ groups and land owners (Gunnarsdotter 2005). 
In the Spanish site, hunting has also been an important social activity for members of all 
social classes. Most villages have a social game estate where local hunters pay a small 
membership fee that entitles them to shooting and enjoy a day with a group of friends, which 
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is considered more important than the quantity and quality of the bag. Hunting is also 
considered an important social activity among, for example, some politicians or business 
men, who use hunting as a backdrop for business talk or bonding, as data from our focus 
group discussions suggests.  
Bear hunting in Croatia and Slovenia and lynx hunting in Norway are relatively new 
phenomena.  Until recently considered as pest species, bears and lynx are nowadays highly 
appreciated trophy game. Although it appears that particularly lynx hunting is often 
motivated by the desire to limit its population, there is also an emerging body of hunters who 
value lynx hunting as a recreational activity, regarding it as a particularly challenging form of 
hunting. For these specialised teams, lynx hunting is clearly an important identity-building 
interest and conveys status. In Croatia and Slovenia, bear hunting began with the 1947 
Hunting Act (Huber et al. 2008b), and had become popular among foreign hunters by the 
1960s (Frković 2002). Similar to the Spanish case, it was often used as a platform for 
political negotiations. Today bear hunting continues to be a commercial type of hunting in 
Croatia, and quotas and high trophy fees make the bear hunt an exclusive, but culturally 
embedded form of hunting.  
Overall, hunting thus appears to have significant social functions as it helps to develop 
symbolic and social capital, especially in terms of creating and maintaining bonds within 
one’s social group. Interestingly, these types of capital can in some cases indeed, as described 
by Bourdieu (1977), be transferred into economic capital, as for example, in our Ethiopian 
and Spanish sites.  
 
4.4 Tensions between social, ecological and economic functions   
Hunting is thus expected to fulfil many different functions in our case studies. As mentioned 
above, these are not always complementary, and often result in conflicts. With regard to the 
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ecological functions of hunting, there are often disagreements over optimal population levels 
of a game species (Section 4.1). The many different economic functions of hunting cause 
tensions about the distribution of socioeconomic benefits of hunting, while the social 
functions of hunting, bound by cultural norms and customs, result in tensions between 
traditional and more recently developed uses of natural resources. There are, however, not 
only tensions within the various functions but also between the different categories of 
functions.  
Two patterns emerge from our case studies, both based on conflicts between ecological 
functions of hunting and social and/or economic functions. These conflicts either lead to 
‘overhunting’, i.e., adverse impacts on survival of a species in an area, or the opposite, i.e., 
‘underhunting’, when a population of a game species has impacts perceived as negative, or 
negatively affects habitats that are of value to others.  
In Ethiopia and Tanzania the major conflict is the interaction between ecological and socio-
economic functions of hunting. Many conservation actors believe that the approach to 
hunting practiced by many local communities has the potential to cause serious declines in 
wildlife populations (Loibooki et al. 2002). In Spain, the main conflict results from the 
interaction between the ecological and economic functions of partridge hunting. Over the past 
decades, partridge hunting has become a profitable business in Spain (Garrido 2009). Indeed, 
over-hunting is, together with changes in agriculture, the main cause explaining the critical 
decline of Spanish partridges (Blanco-Aguiar 2007). As a consequence of an increasing 
demand for large daily bags (obtained through drive shoots), managers aim to produce as 
many birds as possible, which ultimately helps to increase their income. Some of these 
management practices, such as indiscriminate predator control or releases of farm-reared 
partridges, have negatively affected biodiversity conservation (Villafuerte et al. 1998, 
Rodríguez and Delibes 2004) and could thus be described as ‘overmanagement’.   
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In contrast, ‘underhunting’ characterises the conflict in our other study cases. In Scotland and 
Sweden, the two main functions of deer and moose stalking, respectively, are cultural 
(stalking as a culturally important ‘sporting’ or recreational activity) and ecological (culling 
to allow forest regeneration) in nature; and those advocating the ecological function maintain 
that not enough stalking takes place. In Croatia, hunting ground managers focus their bear 
hunting efforts on the lucrative large individuals. However, they cannot always attract enough 
hunters due to the highly competitive bear hunting market. As a result, some hunting grounds 
do not meet their prescribed bear cull quota, resulting in cull numbers that are substantially 
lower than the quota originally determined. 
In Norway, the main goal for lynx hunting is to maintain the population close to the level that 
was set by parliament in 2003. In principle, this should balance competing interests between 
conservationists, livestock herders and roe deer hunters. However, in practice there is a great 
deal of discussion about the actual size of the population, the level at which the goal has been 
set, and the way the population is distributed in space, with environmental NGOs claiming 
that too many lynx are hunted (over-hunting) and farmers claiming the opposite 
(underhunting)  (Linnell et al. 2010). Struggles over perceived ‘underhunting’, ‘overhunting’ 
and ‘overmanagement’, i.e., disputes over the degree to which perceived functions of hunting 
should be translated into action, are thus widespread in our study areas.  
 
5 Multiple institutions and institutional interplay (Step 2) 
How can such tensions arising between different functions of hunting be reduced? We argue 
that an institutional perspective that focuses on how the functions of hunting are embedded in 
(and framed by) formal and informal institutions can help us to understand tensions and 
provide suggestions for possible solutions. In this section, we examine the links between 
hunting functions and the institutional rules regulating these functions. Again, we can discern 
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institutions that deal with (i) ecological functions of hunting, i.e., rules addressing population 
management, (ii) economic functions, in particular, institutions regulating access to and 
monetary benefits from hunting, and (iii) social functions, such as rules and norms 
concerning social status and social capital.  An analysis of their interplay gives important 
pointers towards the need for institutional change, if disputes over hunting are to be 
addressed.  
Interestingly, many formal institutions in our case studies, especially the most recent hunting 
and wildlife policies, explicitly recognise the multifunctionality of hunting and wildlife 
management. For example, in Castilla-La Mancha (Spain), the Hunting Act (1993) and the 
associated Hunting Regulation (1996) address both ecological and economic functions of 
hunting, and aim to promote nature conservation as well as the practice of recreational 
hunting as a hobby and an activity that generates local employment. Also in Croatia, Norway, 
Sweden and Tanzania, the current hunting or wildlife policy is built on the idea that hunting 
needs to strike a balance between economic and ecological objectives. It thus seems that 
contemporary formal institutions that regulate hunting tend to acknowledge the multiple aims 
underpinning hunting activities. However, they might not take the existence of different 
functions within each of these categories into account. For example, while hunting in 
Tanzania and Ethiopia fulfils economic functions at the national level as it generates income 
to the state, it also has important economic functions for the local population whose 
livelihoods are partly reliant on consumption and trade of bushmeat. However, these forms of 
hunting are classified as illegal by current legislation. Economic and ecological functions as 
defined by those in power are thus not necessarily reconciled with the functions that hunting 
has for the local population, who use their own informal institutions to address the social, 
ecological and economic functions as defined from their perspectives. For example, there are 
many rules and customs associated with bushmeat hunting in our Tanzanian and Ethiopian 
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study sites, including rules on which species are hunted, hunting methods and the selection of 
the person to lead the hunting trip, and, in south Ethiopia where firearms are used, to do the 
shooting. Due to the formal illegality of these activities, conflicts arise between illegal 
hunters and those enforcing the law, for example, rangers of national parks and game 
reserves. Because of the current property rights that give the state the ownership of hunting 
rights, local residents thus forego the potential benefits of hunting – but what is more, they 
often also have to bear the costs of increased wildlife populations and conservation activities 
(for example, due to land use restrictions or crop damage by elephants) without obtaining a 
share of the economic benefits of state-sanctioned hunting. In addition, informal institutions 
that regulate illegal or bushmeat hunting are not static, but develop and partly erode over time 
due to wider societal changes. Our focus group discussions in western Serengeti suggest that 
hunting taboos associated with species such as zebra or elephant by some ethnic groups have 
disappeared over recent years. As these informal rules are not effectively replaced by the 
formal institutions defined by government, a vacuum develops that ultimately affects the 
degree to which economic, ecological and social functions can be fulfilled. Overall, in some 
of our study cases, formal institutions that regulated hunting thus ignored local, informal 
arrangements with regard to hunting. This had two types of consequences: (a) the potential 
power of informal institutions, such as taboos, for sustainable (i.e. viable on the long term 
and in line with ecological, economic and social requirements; Baker 2006) hunting was not 
effectively used and (b) parts of the population, typically those not wealthy enough to obtain 
formal rights to hunting, were denied the benefits of hunting. In addition, and this might not 
only hold for our African, but also for some of the European cases, such formal institutions 
also neglected the unequal distribution of costs incurred by land management for hunting. 
A second pattern emerged from the analysis of our case studies, in particular, in Scotland, 
Spain, and also in Slovenia. Here a number of relatively recent formal institutions address 
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ecological functions of wildlife management, often connected to international conventions 
and EU directives. These are then translated into national and regional law as well as, for 
example, Habitat Action Plans and Natura 2000 designations. At the same time, and 
unconnected to these, formal institutions exist that govern economic and often also social 
functions of wildlife management and hunting. For example, the economic and social 
functions of deer stalking in Scotland are to a large degree founded in the distribution of 
property rights: Land holdings are generally large, ranging in size from 1,000 to over 10,000 
hectares (MacMillan and Leitch 2008), and the right to hunt generally lies with the 
landowner. While this right is in many cases used to obtain income from paying clients or 
shooting syndicates, it is often exerted to fulfil social functions, for example, to take family, 
friends and business colleagues out stalking. Resting on these formal rights to hunting, an 
informal institutional context has been developing since Victorian times that includes 
customs on social relations and dress codes, and regulates the social and economic functions 
of deer stalking in the uplands (Phillip et al. 2009). In contrast, the national and European 
rules governing ecological aspects are rather recent, and in many ways seem to have 
developed in parallel to, and are not embedded in, the existing property rights regimes. While 
these institutions set the scene for land management in the Scottish uplands and are a means 
to formalise conservation goals, they seem to have a rather limited and localised impact on 
deer management. Instead, for example in the Spanish case, partridge management follows 
informal rules on predator control and stock maintenance, even if these are in conflict with 
formal regulations. In Slovenia, since the country’s accession to the EU, the emphasis on 
formal institutions that focus on ecological functions, such as the Habitats Directive, has 
severely constrained the enactment of the social and economic functions that bear hunting 
had granted until then.  
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Two patterns of institutional interplay thus emerge from our case studies: (i) conflicts arise 
between functions of hunting as defined by the government and functions for the local 
population and (ii) ecological functions often seem to be embedded in formal institutions that 
have developed separately to the formal and informal institutions guiding the social and 
economic functions of hunting. While the first pattern could be characterised as a clash 
between formal and informal institutions, the second pattern emerges as formal institutions 
that aim to address ecological aspects come in conflict with a second set of formal 
institutions, supported by informal ones, which embed socio-cultural functions. Here, the 
formal ecological rules are not necessarily defined by a more powerful class, but are 
generated by international and non-local actors who claim the general right to influence 
wildlife management. However, in the eyes of local actors, they seem to ignore the existing 
property rights, cultural norms and traditions that are specifically related to hunting. In both 
cases, locally supported, well embedded and ‘old’ institutions are in conflict with those that 
have recently come in from higher political levels or ‘outside’.  
 
6 Managing multifunctionality and institutional interplay (Step 3) 
In many of our study sites, the multifunctionality of hunting and related negative implications 
of institutional clashes have been implicitly or explicitly recognised. Political and policy 
efforts to reconcile these functions and manage institutional interplay have been undertaken 
or are currently discussed. In this section, we examine a selection of such institutional 
arrangements in relation to the governance structures they draw on (Section 2.3) and the 
degree to which they address the multiple functions and tensions between institutions 
diagnosed above. 
 
6.1 Institutional arrangements to address multifunctionality 
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A first glance at selected examples of institutional arrangements that address the 
multifunctionality of hunting in our study sites (Table 2) suggests that the governance of 
hunting through committees and fora is a very widely used approach. Such committees exist 
in Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, Croatia and Scotland, and tend to focus on single game species 
(such as moose or brown bear) or small groups of related species (such as deer or large 
carnivores). Their general aim is to reconcile conflicting functions of hunting by bringing 
land users, other interest groups and the government together to provide a platform for the 
negotiation of potentially diverging interests. However, a closer look reveals that these 
arrangements cover a wide range of governance approaches, as follows:  
In Scotland, for example, Deer Management Groups (DMGs) are a voluntary association of 
neighbouring land managers, whereas the Deer Commission for Scotland (DCS) was (until 
August 2010, when it merged with a non-departmental government body, Scottish Natural 
Heritage) a statutory body specifically aiming to reconcile deer management with other 
conservation interests. In Croatia and Slovenia, committees consisting of responsible national 
authorities and experts have been established with the responsibility to produce and update 
Brown Bear Management Plans and Action Plans. In both countries, the committees have 
only an advisory function to the responsible ministry. In Norway, Regional Large Carnivore 
Committees consist of elected politicians, and thus represent a move from collaborative fora 
of stakeholders towards representative democracy. These committees are, however, supposed 
to manage lynx in close collaboration with interest groups. 
In summary, such committees and fora combine regulatory and collaborative elements to 
varying degrees. Their governance functions range from a merely advisory role (Croatia, 
Slovenia) to, albeit limited, decision-making power (Norway, Sweden), with some holding 
legal authority to intervene in perceived mismanagement of game (Norway, Sweden, DCS in 
Scotland). Some committees draw solely on voluntary participation (DMGs in Scotland). 
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And while some include a relatively small subsection of interest groups (Scotland, Croatia, 
Slovenia), others are more inclusive (Sweden), with Norway as a special case, where the 
committee consists of elected politicians, and stakeholders are only consulted. Such fora and 
committees also work on varying spatial scales, often to mirror the range of a game 
population, for example in Sweden and Scotland, where institutions are spatially nested to 
manage game at the population level (Scotland: DMGs, Sweden: MMAs, Table 2) and, at the 
same time, reflect local interests (Sweden: MMUs), as well as providing overview and 
coordination (Scotland: DCS, Sweden: WMDs).  
Our examples from Ethiopia, Tanzania and Spain show further variety in institutional 
arrangements to govern multifunctionality. In both Ethiopia and Tanzania, designations exist 
that aim to reconcile conflicting functions of hunting, and that involve government 
authorities, local communities and private companies. In both cases, the main idea is to 
designate areas for hunting to protect them from other land uses that might lead to a decrease 
in game populations, and in exchange, provide benefits for neighbouring communities to 
incentivise wildlife conservation and compensate for land use opportunity costs. The 
Ethiopian approach, the designation of Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), is currently more 
strongly focused on regulation than the Tanzanian Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) 
which require a large degree of collaboration. Symptomatic of this is the establishment of 
Authorised Associations in Tanzania, i.e., community-based organisations managing the 
WMA, whereas the Ethiopian approach draws on command-and-control approaches to 
establish rules and distribute revenue – although demarcation of CHAs and revenue sharing 
are increasingly carried out in a participatory way.  
In Spain, an information- and market-based approach has been suggested by researchers and 
policy makers: A Game Quality Certificate, as a means of setting standards similar to 
international certifications forestry or fishery products, aims to certify those estates that 
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manage game in a sustainable, semi-natural manner (e.g., without releases of farm-reared 
game), and help to maintain valuable habitats or species.  Hunting estates using management 
methods adjudged unsustainable or detrimental to conservation would not receive the 
certificate. Hunters could thus choose their destinations based on the information provided by 
the certification, and thus ideally create economic incentives for estates to move to more 
sustainable approaches of game management.  
This overview suggests that in our study sites, the multifunctionality of hunting is addressed 
through a range of structures: (a) committee-based approaches that combine collaborative 
with regulatory governance to varying degrees, (b) designations of hunting areas of which 
some, again, rely more strongly on regulations, while others are based on collaboration and 
(c) certification systems that combine information with market-based approaches. In the next 
section, we examine the extent to which these structures address the multiple functions 
described above. 
 
6.2 Functions addressed – functions neglected 
Four main findings emerge from our analysis: First, across all study sites, it appears that the 
institutional arrangements considered here address primarily ecological and economic 
functions. For example, in Norway, the elected committee’s collaboration with stakeholder 
groups aims to integrate carnivore conservation and viable livestock husbandry (Sandström et 
al. 2009; Linnell et al. 2010). In some cases, socio-cultural functions of hunting are implicitly 
incorporated, for example, in the Deer Commission for Scotland, where conservation 
interests as well as those of the stalking industry – which comprise not only economic but 
also cultural aspects – are included. However, in other cases, social functions tend to be 
neglected, for example in Sweden, where the transfer of power from local management units 
to large areas, to be implemented in 2011 to better take account of the scale of moose 
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population ranges, raises concerns about the degree to which social functions of hunting can 
be included in large-scale management decisions. In the southwest of Ethiopia, Controlled 
Hunting Areas (CHAs) do not formally take account of the cultural functions of hunting, for 
example, among the Hamar people. In Spain, the suggested Game Quality Certification 
would not address social reasons for hunting in specific areas that are unrelated to the bags 
acquired or the ecological value of the game or the hunting environment.  
Second, and related to this, functions of hunting for local populations are in some cases only 
insufficiently represented by these institutional arrangements. CHAs in Ethiopia do not allow 
hunting by the local population, whether for economic (food) or social (proof of manhood) 
purposes. At the same time, revenue sharing with local communities is either still 
rudimentary, where revenue disbursement is not clearly regulated and depends on the 
goodwill of the regional government, or not satisfactorily implemented and communicated. 
This is the case in the southwest of Ethiopia, where the regional government is currently 
revising their revenue sharing scheme, suggesting that this might improve in the future. 
Similarly, in Scotland, views on hunting held by the wider public – beyond stakeholders from 
conservation and stalking backgrounds – are under-represented in the current collaborative 
fora: The interests of hillwalkers and animal welfare advocates, voiced by their respective 
organisations, are included in round-table discussions, but have not yet found a stronger, 
more formal reflection in the Deer Commission’s or Deer Management Groups’ work. 
Third, and connected to this, not all of the institutional arrangements presented here address 
the tensions between local and international formal institutions. For example, Slovenia is, as a 
member of the EU, committed to stricter international agreements for bear protection than 
Croatia. Although both countries have chosen collaborative approaches, human-bear conflicts 
are a major concern in Slovenia, but not in Croatia (Milner-Gulland et al. 2010). This might 
be due to the dominant role of the EU Habitats Directive in Slovenia, forcing a focus on 
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ecological functions of bear management, and thus ignoring its social and economic 
functions. In contrast, Croatian bear management has been, to date, not answerable to the EU, 
and could thus afford to maintain the synergies between social, economic and ecological 
functions of bear hunting.  
Fourth, problems of over- and under-hunting are not, or only partially, solved by the 
institutional arrangements presented here. Over-hunting, especially in the CHAs in Ethiopia’s 
southwest, still continues due to a number of reasons, including weak law enforcement and 
unclear demarcations. In the Ethiopian highlands, there is also insufficient communication 
between actors where, for example, demarcations are carried out collaboratively between 
communities and regional government, but without the concessionaires, i.e., the hunting 
companies. Under-hunting as in Scotland, Sweden and Croatia is, to date, still ongoing as the 
collaborative arrangements have not yet succeeded in increasing the weight of the population 
control functions of hunting relative to its social and economic purposes. However, this might 
change in the future. In Croatia, improved communication between the committee and 
hunting ground managers has recently led to an increased fulfilment of the quota. In Sweden, 
the introduction of ecosystem-scale management is supposed to improve the match with 
ecological goals. In Scotland, the incorporation of the Deer Commission into Scotland’s 
conservation agency might also help to reduce under-hunting. However, it remains to be seen 
if this shift, heavily contested before its implementation, fosters or hampers sustainable deer 
management in the long run.  
 
7 Conclusions  
Our analysis has shown that in our study cases, hunting has multiple ecological, economic 
and social functions. Two patterns of conflicts between functions emerged: The phenomenon 
of ‘overhunting’ (or ‘over-managing’ in Spain) where, seen from an ecological perspective, 
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too many individuals of a species were hunted in order to fulfil economic and social functions 
of hunting, and ‘underhunting’, where, again for economic and/or social reasons, too few 
individuals were hunted to fulfil ecological functions of hunting.  
We found, however, that such multifunctionality is increasingly recognised in formal 
institutions. Notwithstanding this recognition, formal institutions still often neglect important 
functions of hunting and related formal and informal institutions, such as (a) ecological, 
economic and social functions for local populations in Ethiopia and Tanzania, where hunting 
permits are virtually inaccessible for local people, and (b) more recent ecological functions of 
game management, originating in international agreements on biodiversity management, that 
clash with both formal and informal institutions encapsulating social and economic functions 
of hunting at the local level, for example, in Spain and Scotland.  
Increasingly, complex institutional arrangements are developed that aim to reconcile tensions 
between function-specific institutions. These include, for example, committees, area 
designations and certifications. While superficially similar, these institutions can vary in their 
governance approaches on a spectrum from regulations to collaboration (committees and 
designations) and market-based governance to information (certification). And again, these 
might not necessarily succeed in addressing the multitude of functions that hunting and game 
management might have in a given area. Overall, our analysis suggests that the following 
aspects should be better recognised in institutional arrangements that address hunting:  
First, social functions of hunting and functions for local people need to be given more 
attention. While often very well developed and associated with a range of formal and 
informal institutions, social and cultural functions of hunting are frequently neglected in 
recently emerging institutional arrangements. Similarly, whilst strictly regulated hunting 
access might be desirable from an ecological point of view, the exclusion of local people with 
strong economic and cultural interests in hunting results in conflict. Breaches of regulations 
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are virtually inevitable. In places such as Scotland, where the wider public increasingly 
claims a voice in decisions that concern wildlife management, institutional arrangements 
should be as inclusive as possible. Generally, committees and fora that aim to bring 
stakeholders together might thus need to adopt more open approaches to allow representation 
also of those land uses and interests that are regarded as illegal, or that have only been 
recently emerging. 
Second, where institutional systems have developed in parallel – and seem to be neither 
vertically nor horizontally integrated – they should be actively reconciled. This is required, 
for example, in Scotland, where formal property rights and a wealth of informal hunting 
institutions are in conflict with international formal institutions concerning biodiversity 
management (Irvine et al. 2008). A similar issue has developed in Slovenia: Decision-making 
on bear populations is strongly informed by international agreements, and decoupled from 
local hunting decisions, which seems to lead to tensions among the local population.  
This draws attention to the fact that it is no longer the nation state that is exclusively in 
charge of setting standards for the ecological functions of hunting. For example, the 
European Habitats Directive has a strong impact on national-level biodiversity governance 
through the harmonisation of legislation. Although harmonisation might be a powerful tool to 
reach common goals across the EU, it fails to take the variety of ecological, economic, social 
and cultural aspects of biodiversity management – here specifically of hunting – into 
consideration.  An alternative and possibly more fruitful approach would be to draw on open 
coordination using information-based mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, 
benchmarking and sharing of best practice. This approach would acknowledge the different 
hunting traditions in the member countries and be compatible with the collaborative 
approaches widely used in our study cases.  
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Third, a move from a single-species to an ecosystem approach would contribute to an 
institutionalisation of the multifunctionality of hunting, game management and other 
activities, and help to create institutional synergies at the horizontal level. It would thus 
address the issues of under-hunting, and possibly also over-management as described for the 
Spanish study site. The problem of over-hunting in Ethiopia and Tanzania, in contrast, might 
more appropriately be addressed by (a) a better recognition of the functions of hunting for 
local people as suggested above, and (b) an improved implementation and enforcement of 
existing arrangements, such as Wildlife Management Areas.  
In this study, we explored a range of cases and institutions related to hunting. Our selection of 
examples is by no means exhaustive, for example, there are also fora-based approaches in 
wildlife governance in Tanzania (such as the Serengeti Ecosystem Community Conservation 
Forum). More in-depth approaches are needed to provide detailed insights into each of the 
cases presented here (e.g., Lowassa et al., forth.; Tadie and Fischer, forth.). At the same time, 
future research could scale up and investigate the patterns that emerged from our data with 
quantitative methods and in larger datasets, including a larger number of countries (also from 
southern Africa, where hunting plays an important role in land use) and a wider variety of 
hunting types in each country. Such research could also systematically identify factors that 
foster or hamper success of institutional arrangements that reconcile the multiple functions of 
hunting. However, in this study, our aim was to provide a first overview of the multiple 
functions of hunting, and to identify patterns in the governance of the multifunctionality of 
hunting across a range of cultural, economic and ecological situations in Europe and Africa, 
and our analysis shows that such an approach can be very fruitful to point out shortcomings 
in and recommend modifications for current institutional arrangements that deal with the 
multifunctionality of hunting and wildlife management. 
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Table 1: Overview of study sites with species, key stakeholders and formal hunting rights. 
“Landowner” includes private, charitable and governmental landowners.  
Country: site Target species  Key stakeholders Formal hunting 
rights  
Croatia:  
Gorski kotar 
Brown bear  
(Ursus arctos)  
National and regional 
government, local 
hunters and game 
managers, hunting 
organisations and 
companies, 
researchers  
With the 
government, can be 
leased out.  
Slovenia Brown bear  
(Ursus arctos) 
National government, 
local hunters and 
game managers,  
hunting organisations 
and companies, local 
communities, 
conservation NGOs 
With the 
government, can be 
leased out.  
Norway Eurasian lynx 
(Lynx lynx) 
National government, 
conservation NGOs, 
reindeer and livestock 
herders, landowners, 
hunters and wildlife 
managers 
With the 
landowner, can be 
leased out. 
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Sweden Moose 
(Alces alces) 
National government, 
landowners, local 
hunters and game 
managers, 
conservation NGOs  
With the 
landowner, can be 
leased out. 
Scotland  Red deer 
(Cervus elaphus) 
National government, 
landowners, local 
hunters and wildlife 
managers, tourist 
hunters 
With the 
landowner, can be 
leased out. 
Ethiopia: 
(i) South-western 
lowlands 
(South Omo)  
(ii) South- eastern 
highlands 
(Bale)  
(i) All lowland 
wildlife, 
including giraffe 
(Giraffa 
camelopardalis) , 
buffalo (Syncerus 
caffer), various 
gazelle species   
(ii) Legally 
hunted ‘trophy’ 
species  
National and regional  
government, local 
communities, hunting 
companies, tourist 
hunters 
With the 
government, can be 
leased out (within 
Controlled Hunting 
Areas). Hunting 
without license 
thus illegal.  
Tanzania: western 
Serengeti 
‘Bushmeat’: 
Migratory blue 
wildebeest 
(Connochaetes 
National government, 
local communities, 
conservation NGOs, 
hunting companies 
With the 
government.  
Bushmeat hunting 
without license 
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taurinus), plains 
zebra (Equus 
burchelli), 
resident species 
such as buffalo 
(Syncerus caffer) 
thus illegal.  
Spain: Castilla La 
Mancha 
Red-legged 
partridge 
(Alectoris rufa) 
Regional government, 
landowners, local 
hunters, tourist 
hunters and game 
managers  
With the 
landowner, can be 
leased out. 
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Table 2: Examples of institutional arrangements addressing multifunctionality in our study 
cases 
Country Institutional arrangement Type 
Croatia Committee for the 
development and 
implementation of the Brown 
Bear Management Plan for the 
Republic of Croatia 
Committee for monitoring 
large carnivore populations in 
the Republic of Croatia  
Collaborative arrangements involving key 
stakeholders in consultation and joint planning 
with government to manage long-term 
sustainability of brown bear as a game species.  
Slovenia  Committee for large carnivore 
management – expert group 
and stakeholder group 
Collaborative arrangements involving key 
stakeholders in consultation and joint planning 
with government to set quota and develop 
Brown Bear Management Strategy and 5-year 
action plan. 
Norway  Regional Large Carnivore 
Committees   
Regulatory mechanism targeted at the 
reconciliation between carnivore conservation 
and livestock and hunting interests. 
Implementation decentralised to indirectly 
elected politicians at regional level.  
Sweden  Moose Management Units 
(MMU) and Moose 
Management Areas (MMA) 
and Wildlife Management 
Collaborative arrangement involving key 
stakeholders at local (MMU), ecosystem 
(MMA) and regional level (WMD) with the task 
to reconcile different objectives through moose 
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Delegations (WMD) population control.   
Scotland  Deer Commission for Scotland 
(DCS – until 20102) and Deer 
Management Groups (DMG) 
Collaborative arrangement at local (DMG) and 
Scottish (DCS) level bringing selected key 
stakeholders together to reconcile different deer 
management objectives.   
Ethiopia Controlled Hunting Areas Regulatory mechanism involving government, 
communities and private companies to protect 
wildlife and its habitat and, to some degree, 
share revenue from hunting. 
Tanzania  Wildlife Management Areas Collaborative arrangement between 
government, communities and private 
companies (implemented through ‘Authorised 
Associations’, i.e. specially formed community 
organisations that can use or sell hunting 
quotas) to protect wildlife and its habitat and 
share revenues from hunting and other tourism.  
Spain  Game quality certification 
(suggested) 
Information- and market-based arrangement 
certifying hunting estates based on standards of 
ecologically and socially responsible as well as 
economically viable hunting.  
 
                                                          
2
 Our analysis began in 2009, which gave us the opportunity to include the merger of the DCS with Scotland’s 
conservation agency in our study. 
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Fig. 1: Conceptual framework, showing the three steps of our analysis  
(1) Functions of hunting
(2) Institutional interplay
Property rights
(3) Institutions for 
multifunctionality
Market-based Hierarchies Cooperation Information
Economic
e.g., subsistence, 
revenue from trophies
and meat
Social-cultural
e.g., social 
identity, recreation
Ecological
e.g., population 
control
Social-cultural
e.g., informal 
codes of practice, 
access rules
Economic
e.g., market 
mechanisms, laws
Ecological
e.g., 
management plans
e.g., fora for 
collaborative 
management
?
e.g., statutory 
rights to intervene 
in game 
management
e.g., creation of 
markets for certified 
game
e.g., game 
certificates
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Fig. 2: Research process 
Scoping phase: descriptions of hunting systems in 
study countries
Agreements on scope of study cases, basic elements 
of conceptual framework (e.g., formal/informal 
institutions, functions of hunting) – May 2009
Document analysis: 
legislation and 
literature on formal 
(and informal) 
institutions
Focus group discussions and 
interviews: Informal 
institutions, perceptions of 
institutional arrangements 
(following a joint coding scheme) 
– February-June 2010 
Reports on institutional arrangements governing 
hunting in each study case
Identification of commonalities, differences, patterns, 
comparison to theoretical concepts, refinement of 
conceptual framework – November 2010
Refined reports from each case study
Write-up
n iterations
 
